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01.05.2006
1 Minute
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a
single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension
extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity
of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages:
simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which
competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins
a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of
information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the
number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of
this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the
contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a
tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard
Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.
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01.04.2006
1 Minute
We set up a simple political economy model where economic
integration raises the profitability of multinational firms. In
this setting redistributive taxation may rise following economic
integration, if the effects of the widened income gap dominate the
higher excess burden of the tax.
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01.04.2006
1 Minute
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives,
transactions within firms are often not incentivized. We offer an
explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an
otherwise standard moral hazard model with multiple agents. Envious
agents suffer if other agents receive a higher wage due to random
shocks to their performance measures. The necessary compensation
for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which
generates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover,
empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are
more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals
who interact only in the market. Flat-wage contracts are thus more
likely to be optimal in firms than in markets.
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01.04.2006
1 Minute
For the estimation of many econometric models, integrals without
analytical solutions have to be evaluated. Examples include limited
dependent variables and nonlinear panel data models. In the case of
one-dimensional integrals, Gaussian quadrature is known to work
efficiently for a large class of problems. In higher dimensions,
similar approaches discussed in the literature are either very
specific and hard to implement or suffer from exponentially rising
computational costs in the number of dimensions - a problem known
as the "curse of dimensionality" of numerical integration. We
propose a strategy that shares the advantages of Gaussian
quadrature methods, is very general and easily implemented, and
does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Monte Carlo
experiments for the random parameters logit model indicate the
superior performance of the proposed method over simulation
techniques.
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01.03.2006
1 Minute
There is strong evidence that in bargaining situations with
asymmetric outside options people exhibit self-serving biases
concerning their fairness judgements. Moreover, psychological
literature suggests that this can be a driving force of bargaining
impasse. This paper extends the notion of inequity aversion to
incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options
and analyses whether this leads to bargaining breakdown. I
distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents, that is, those
agents who understand their bias and those who do not. I find that
breakdown in ultimatum bargaining results from naiveté of the
proposers.
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