47 Cyberkrieg und militärische Cyber-Operationen im Russland-Ukrainekrieg 2022-2024

Cyberkrieg in der Ukraine: Wie sich militärische
Cyberoperationen im Verlauf des Krieges verändert haben


In der neuesten Folge des Percepticon Podcasts werfen wir einen
detaillierten Blick auf die Entwicklung militärischer
Cyberoperationen im Ukrainekrieg. Im dritten Kriegsjahr zeigt
sich, dass sich die Logik und der Nutzen von Cyberangriffen
grundlegend gewandelt haben – von öffentlichkeitswirksamer
Disruption hin zu strategischer Unterstützung konventioneller
Kriegsführung.


Während zu Beginn des Krieges russische Cyberangriffe vor allem
auf öffentlichkeitswirksame Disruption und psychologische
Beeinflussung abzielten, hat sich der Fokus mittlerweile auf
strategische Unterstützung konventioneller Kriegsführung
verlagert. Besonders auffällig ist die zunehmende Integration von
Cyberoperationen in klassische militärische Taktiken, etwa durch
gezielte Spionage und Informationsbeschaffung zur Zielerfassung
für Artillerieangriffe.


Themen sind:



Entwicklung russischer
Cyberstrategien: Von disruptiven Angriffen auf
zivile Infrastruktur hin zu gezielten Operationen gegen
militärische Systeme.


Die Rolle der ukrainischen
Cyberabwehr: Wie effektive Verteidigungsmaßnahmen
die operative Komplexität russischer Angriffe reduziert haben.


Vergleich mit konventionellen
Waffen: Warum Drohnen, Artillerie und
Marschflugkörper oft effektiver sind als Cyberangriffe.


Langfristige Lehren: Welche Implikationen
der Ukrainekrieg für zukünftige Konflikte hat und wie sich
Cyberoperationen weiterentwickeln könnten.



Cyberangriffe haben sich als weniger zerstörerisch erwiesen, als
viele Analysten ursprünglich erwartet hatten. Stattdessen dienen
sie primär der Aufklärung, Subversion und psychologischen
Einflussnahme. Der Podcast beleuchtet auch die Grenzen von
Cyberoperationen und zeigt, warum sie oft nur eine unterstützende
Rolle spielen – insbesondere in einem Zermürbungskrieg, bei dem
konventionelle Waffen wie Drohnen und Artillerie entscheidend
sind.
Shownotes

https://percepticon.de/2022/31-russland-ukraine-konflikt-in-der-digitalen-domaene/


https://percepticon.de/2022/32-cyber-konflikt-zwischen-russland-und-der-ukraine-hot-take-25-02-2022/


AFP, Staff Writer With. 2024. “Russia Could Be Able to Attack
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Balmforth, Tom. 2024. “Exclusive: Russian Hackers Were inside
Ukraine Telecoms Giant for Months.” Reuters, January 5, 2024,
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Bateman, Jon. 2022. “Russia’s Wartime Cyber Operations in
Ukraine: Military Impacts, Influences, and Implications.”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/russias-wartime-cyber-operations-in-ukraine-military-impacts-influences-and-implications?lang=en.


Bryjka, Filip. 2024. “Russia Intensifies Disinformation Offensive
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Cattler, David, and Daniel Black. 2022. “The Myth of the Missing
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Charap, Samuel, and Khrystyna Holynska. 2024. “Russia’s War Aims
in Ukraine: Objective-Setting and the Kremlin’s Use of Force
Abroad.” RAND Corporation.
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Faulconbridge, Guy. 2024. “Putin Says Russia Is Carving out a
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Fleming, Jeremy. 2022. “The Head of GCHQ Says Vladimir Putin Is
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Gady, Franz-Stefan, and Michael Kofman. 2024. “Making Attrition
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Givens, Austen, Max Gorbachevsky, and Anita Biernat. 2023. “How
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Glimore, David. 2024. “The Rising Threat of Ransomware in
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Gustafson, Kristian, Dan Lomas, Steven Wagner, Neveen Shaaban
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Hackett, Michael, and John Nagl. 2024. “A Long, Hard Year:
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Jensen, Benjamin, and Elizabeth Hoffman. 2024. “Victory in
Ukraine Starts with Addressing Five Strategic Problems,” May.
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Jójárt, Krisztián. 2024. “The War against Ukraine through the
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Jones, Seth G. 2022. “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine:
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Jones, Seth G., Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer. 2023.
“Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition,” February.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-innovation-war-attrition.


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Lin, Herbert. 2022. “Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of
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Lonergan, Erica D, and Margeret Smith. 2023. “Evaluating
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Maschmeyer, Lennart. 2024. “Cyber Conflict and Subversion in the
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Moore, Daniel. 2022. Offensive Cyber Operations: Understanding
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Mueller, Grace B., Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, Ryan C.
Maness, and Jose M. Macias. 2023. “Cyber Operations during the
Russo-Ukrainian War. From Strange Patterns to Alternative
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Naraine, Ryan. 2024. “North Korea Hackers Linked to Breach of
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Pedersen, Frederik A H, and Jeppe T Jacobsen. 2024. “Narrow
Windows of Opportunity: The Limited Utility of Cyber Operations
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https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae014.


Pleitgen, Katie Bo Lillis, Natasha Bertrand, Frederik. 2024.
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Revay, Geri. 2022. “An Overview of the Increasing Wiper Malware
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Sabbagh, Dan, Dan Sabbagh Defence, and security editor. 2023.
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Schulze, Matthias, and Mika Kerttunen. 2023. “Cyber Operations in
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Sobczak, Aaron. 2024. “Poll: Over 50% of Ukrainians Want to End
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Timecodes

01:55 Forschungsstand

11:29 Nicht so nützlich, wie Panzer

13:10 die Evolution des Ukrainekrieges

17:16 War of attrition

19:05 Evolution der Cyberkriegsführung

20:20 2022: öffentlichkeitswirksame Disruption gegen zivile
Ziele

24:20 Punishment Angriffe auf das Energienetz

26:34 2023: Höheres Tempo, mehr strategische Angriffe

28:00 Das Smartphone als primäres Angriffsziel

34:00 Abnehmende Qualität der Angriffe

37:00 2024 Integration von Cyber und konventionellen
Fähigkeiten

38:21 290 Angriffe pro Monat, 3000 Cyber Ops pro Jahr

41:00 Intelligence tradecraft & pretexting

43:00 Anpassungen der russischen Cyberstrategie 2022-2024

45:00 Fazit: Cyber ist nur Support 

Hinweise

Blog & Podcast über die dunkle Seite der Digitalisierung:
Cyber-Sicherheit, Cyber-War, Spionage, Hacker, Sabotage,
Subversion und Desinformation. Kommentare und konstruktives
Feedback bitte auf percepticon.de oder via Twitter. Dieser Cyber
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Sound & Copyright

Modem Sound, Creative Commons.

Vint Cerf, „Internet shows up in December 1975“, in: IEEE
Computer Society, Computing Conversations: Vint Cerf on the
History of Packets, December 2012.

L0pht Heavy Industries testifying before the United States
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Live feed from CSPAN,
May 19, 1998.

Barack Obama, Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection Summit
Address, 13 February 2015, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

Michael Hayden, „We kill people based on meta-data,“ in: The
Johns Hopkins Foreign Affairs Symposium Presents: The Price of
Privacy: Re-Evaluating the NSA, April 2014.

Bruce Schneier, „Complexity is the enemy of security, in IEEE
Computer Society, Bruce Schneier: Building Cryptographic Systems,
March 2016.

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