Special Edition Afghanistan: Through the Eyes of a Leader

In May of 2009, 3rd Squadron 61st Cavalry Regiment deployed to
Nuristan, Afghanistan a small eastern province bordering
Pakistan. When they arrived, they occupied the most fringe
outposts of Regional Command East, several of which were only
accessible by helicopter, and then only during the cover of the
darkest nights of each month, in order to avoid rocket propelled
grenade attacks against the airframe.


 


The squadron commander for the deployment was then-lieutenant
Robert “Brad” Brown. In preparation for that deployment, he,
along with then-Colonel Randy George, went on the pre-deployment
site survey to better understand the terrain and complex
environment of which they were only months away from assuming
responsibility. During that trip, they arrived at Combat Outpost
Keating, a remote outpost named for Ben Keating, who had died
attempting to drive one of the lumbering resupply vehicles down
the treacherous road back to the forward operating base. Standing
in that base built in a valley at the base of three mountains and
backed up to two rivers, both men understood that there could be
no delay in closing that base for the safety of their Troopers.
Anyone who visited COP Keating knew full well that it was the
tactically indefensible position in which you could ever place
yourself.


 


But that wasn’t the only conundrum. COP Keating wasn’t alone. In
order to close it, you would have to close the other two outposts
in the surrounding area, almost simultaneously to ensure that
they could provide reinforcing fires for one another.
Concurrently, south of the forward operating base, one the
observation posts that LTC Brown would be assuming responsibility
for had recently been completely overrun by the Taliban, who
attacked up a mountain as the Afghan National Army abandoned
their post, forcing the remaining US Troopers to call for a
broken arrow, requesting fire on their position as they were
being overrun. And to complicate all of that, the going-in
position of relieving the outgoing unit would have them arrayed
across a vast swath of land, terribly difficult to resupply, with
barely enough Troopers to simply pull security on their own
position.


 


For multiple reasons they were unable to close COP Keating, OP
Fritsche, and COP Lowell as quickly as they needed to. Unknown to
the base closure planners of 3-61CAV, as they were simultaneously
planning to close the three outposts in Kamdesh, the Taliban was
planning a massive complex attack to prevent them from ever
leaving.


 


On the morning of October 3rd, 2009 more than 400 insurgents
attacked OP Fritsche and COP Keating simultaneously. A force of
only 52 Troopers defended COP Keating, even after Afghan National
Army abandoned their post and the insurgents broke through the
perimeter, causing a small group of Troopers, led by Staff
Sergeant Clint Romesha, to engage the enemy in close-quarters
combat, retaking the COP. However, at the end of the day, the
Troopers of Black Knight troop, 3rd squadron 61st cavalry
regiment would be saying their final goodbyes to eight of their
friends who had given their lives during that battle.


 


The diligent devotion of their squadron commander, however,
ensured that this moment would not be easily erased from history.
LTC Brown and his staff worked to guarantee the recognition of
the heroic efforts of those who went above and beyond to place
themselves in harm’s way to protect each other, destroy the
enemy, and bring the remains of their friends home. Those efforts
to ensure recognition succeeded.


 


What has since become known as the “Battle of Kamdesh,” resulted
in the following awards:


 


Two Medals of Honor for SSG Clint Romesha and SSG Ty Carter


Two Distinguished Service Crosses for 1LT Andrew Bundermann and
SSG Justin Gellagos (posthumously awarded)


Nine Silver Stars


18 bronze stars with “V” device for valor


37 Army Commendation Medals with “V” device for valor


And 27 Purple hearts for wounds sustained in combat


 


SSG Romesha authored the book “Red Platoon” and Jake Tapper
authored “The Outpost,” which has since been turned into a major
motion picture.


 


The fall-out of the battle, including the loss of life, took it’s
toll on everyone involved and amongst others within the squadron,
however. The subsequent investigation held both COL George and
LTC Brown responsible, even though the ISAF-commander at the
time, GEN Stanley McChrystal, agreed there was nothing more they
could have tactically done to prevent the disaster. Many of the
Troopers completed their obligation and left the army, preferring
lives of quiet and peace, away from the constant reminder of the
toughest day of their life.


 


LTC Brown however, still had eight months left to command his
squadron through a deployment in one of the most kinetic
provinces in all of Afghanistan. The two artillery guns on his
forward operating base fired over 6000 rounds total during their
year-long deployment. He had lost two beloved Troopers before
Keating, while sending back home dozens of wounded Troopers
before and after the Battle for Kamdesh. To put it in context, in
the first four months of his deployment, LTC Brown’s squadron of
rag-tag cavalrymen were attacked more than 238 times across seven
separate locations. And yet, he persevered with courage,
humility, devotion, and determination.


It is why those of us who served with him as the commander of 3rd
squadron 61st cavalry regiment unabashedly and unquestionably
remember him, to this day, as the best leader we ever served
with. As his former chaplain, I can guarantee that he’s the real
deal and I am humbled to know him. So without further ado, here
is the one and only, Brad Brown.