Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 01/03 Archiv

This paper reports on a two-task principal-agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece rate contracts. Many principals reward high efforts on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high efforts on both tasks. In contrast, almost all agents with a piece rate contract focus on the first task and disregard the second. Principals understand this and predominantly offer bonus contracts. This behavior contradicts the self-interest theory but is consistent with theories of fairness.

The rise of barter and non-cash payments has become a dominant feature of the Russian transition to a market economy. This paper confronts with empirical evidence two approaches to explain barter in Russia: the ’illusion view’ and the ’trust view’ of barter. The ’illusion view’ suggests that barter allows the parties to pretend that the manufacturing sector in Russia is producing value added by enabling this sector to sell its output at a higher price than its market value. The ’trust view’ sees barter as an institution to deal with the absence of trust and liquidity in the Russian economy. We confront the prediction of both explanations with actual data on barter in Ukraine in 1997. The data reject the ’illusion view‘ in favor of the ‘trust view‘ of barter.

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incentives and become superior when there are some fair-minded players. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts, even preferring a pure bonus contract over a contract that combines the enforcement power of explicit and implicit incentives. This contract preference is associated with the fact that explicit incentives weaken the enforcement power of implicit bonus incentives significantly. Our results are largely consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which also offer interesting new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness and incentives.

Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement will lead to major job losses. More recently, these fears about job losses have extended to high skill labor and IT jobs. The paper examines with new firm level data whether these fears are justified for the two neighboring countries of Eastern Enlargement Austria and Germany. I find that Eastern Enlargement leads to surprising small job losses, because jobs in Eastern Europe do not compete with jobs in Austria and Germany. Low cost jobs of affiliates in Eastern Europe help Austrian and German firms to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. However, I also find that multinational firms in Austria and Germany are outsourcing the most skill intensive activities to Eastern Europe taking advantage of cheap abundant skilled labor in Eastern Europe. I find that the firms’ outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are a response to a human capital scarcity in Austria and Germany which has become particularly severe in the 1990s. Corporations’ outsourcing of skill intensive firm activity to Eastern Europe has helped to ease the human capital crisis in both countries. I find that high skilled jobs transferred to Eastern Europe account for 10 percent of Germany’s and 48 percent of Austria’s supply of university graduates in the 1990s. I then discuss what can be done to address the skill exodus to Eastern Europe. I show that R&D subsidies do not work in economies with a skill crisis and I suggest to liberalize the movement of high skill labor with Eastern Enlargement.

Many people in the European Union fear that Eastern Enlargement will lead to major job losses. More recently, these fears about job losses have extended to high skill labor and IT jobs. The paper examines with new firm level data whether these fears are justified for the two neighboring countries of Eastern Enlargement Austria and Germany. We find that Eastern Enlargement leads to surprising small job losses, because jobs in Eastern Europe do not compete with jobs in Austria and Germany. Low cost jobs of affiliates in Eastern Europe help Austrian and German firms to stay competitive in an increasingly competitive environment. However, we also find that multinational firms in Austria and Germany are outsourcing the most skill intensive activities to Eastern Europe taking advantage of cheap abundant skilled labor in Eastern Europe. We find that the firms' outsourcing activities to Eastern Europe are a response to a human capital scarcity in Austria and Germany which has become particularly severe in the 1990s. Corporations' outsourcing of skill intensive firm activity to Eastern Europe has helped to ease the human capital crisis in both countries. We find that high skilled jobs transferred to Eastern Europe account for 10 percent of Germany's and 48 percent of Austria's supply of university graduates in the 1990s. We then discuss what can be done to address the skill exodus to Eastern Europe. We show that R&D subsidies do not work in economies with a skill crisis and we suggest to liberalize the movement of high skill labor with Eastern Enlargement.

The article illustrates how the integration of modern theory of finance and stochastic dynamic macroeconomic analysis provides a deeper understanding of the link between asset prices and consumption. It shows that this approach gives only a partial explanation for recent trends in US consumption. Comparing wealth effects in Anglo Saxon countries with continental Europe, the paper provides a perspective of the challenges for European monetary policy arising from wealth effects on consumption.

The reluctant reaction of western governments to the AIDS crisis in developing countries is only one example for policy areas where we observe a lack of political action despite a public interest in policy change. The reasons for that lie in the two-stage structure of the political decision-making process: Interest groups influence both the policy choice and the subsequent decision on the level of policy implementation. The lobbies' interest in reform and the issue-specific chance for compromise determine the policy choice. The interest groups' failure to agree on political strategies creates reduced incentives to support policy implementation.

The Great Depression in Germany led to the radicalization of the electorate, leading the country and then the world into the darkest days of Western Civilization. Could it have been otherwise? This paper explores whether the NSDAP takeover might have been averted with a fiscal policy that lowered the unemployment rate in those parts of Germany where their support rose most rapidly. A counterfactual simulation model based on estimates of the relationship between unemployment and the radical vote at the electoral district level provides a framework for considering how much lower unemployment would have to have been in those districts to prevent the NSDAP from becoming a formidable political force in Germany. Budget neutrality is maintained, so that the simulations do not depend on an expanded fiscal policy. The results indicate that such a policy could well have averted the NSDAP's seizure of power, and the catastrophe that followed in its wake.

This note gives a fairly complete statistical description of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter (1997), originally proposed by Leser (1961). It builds on an approach to seasonal adjustment suggested by Leser (1963) and Schlicht (1981, 1984). A moments estimator for the smoothing parameter is proposed that is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum-likelihood estimator, has a straightforward intuitive interpretation and is more appropriate for short series than the maximum-likelihood estimator. The method is illustrated by an application and several simulations.

The paper models the links between financial fragility, asset markets and monetary policy. It is shown that central bank’s concern about the cost of financial disruption may generate an asymmetric response, thus contributing to the creation of an asset price bubble. In an economy with a highly leveraged financial structure, the central bank has an incentive to prevent a “run” on financial intermediation by injecting liquidity when asset values fall significantly. The inflationary side effect of this policy, reducing the real value of nominal debt, is what gives rise to a “put option” for investors. Leveraged investors, rationally anticipating this liquidity injection, drive asset prices above their fundamental values. The bubble will be equal to the expected value of capital gains on outstanding debt. The paper shows that it is rational for central banks to inject liquidity in a crisis, whenever there is the risk of spillover effects arising from the disruption of financial intermediation.

Globalisation means gains from trade, but not for everyone. As gains from trade come along with factor price convergence, substantial fractions of the working classes in the high-wage countries of the West are likely to belong to the group of losers. In this situation it is tempting for the welfare state to help out, but the difficulties are enormous. On the one hand, the payment of social replacement incomes makes wages stick, preventing the gains from trade, causing mass unemployment and turning the economies of the West into bazaars with excessive outsourcing and offshoring activities. On teh other, taxes needed for compensation payments to the working classes can hardly be levied from the mobile factors of production, given that globalisation has increased their mobility. This is a double dilemma for the welfare state. The paper discusses the possibilites of mitigating the dilemmas by paying wage subsidies for domestic residents and encouraging private savings so as to give workers a capital income in the future.

A PAYGO system may serve as insurance against not having children and as an enforcement device for ungrateful children who are unwilling to pay their parents a pension. In fact, the latter was Bismarck’s historic motive for introducing this system. It is true that the PAYGO system reduces the investment in human capital, but if it is run on a sufficiently small scale, it may nevertheless bring about a welfare improvement. If, on the other hand, the scale of the system is so large that parents bequeath some of their pensions to their children, it is overdrawn and creates unnecessarily strong disincentives for human capital investment.